Jump to Content

Recommendation issued to: Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Recommendation details
Output No: R20020054
Date issued: 04 November 2002
Safety action status:
Background: Why this Recommendation was developed

Output text

Safety Recommendation

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review the location of fire bottles on aircraft to reduce the possibility of a premature discharge of fire retardant where the temperature in the area that contains the fire bottle rises above the setting of the fusible valve.

Initial response
Date issued: 18 November 2002
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Action status: Open
Response text:

The authority's response to this Recommendation is the same as that dated 12 September 2002, to Recommendation A of the draft Report. A copy of that letter is enclosed for your information.

When CASA completes its investigation and review that is referred to in that letter, CASA will advise the Bureau of the outcomes.

ATSB response:

ATSB Note: The response referred to was part of CASA's Directly Involved Party response to the draft report BO/200102710. It stated:

'Thank you for providing a copy of draft Aviation Investigation Report 200102710 on the accident involving Embraer Banteirante VH-OZG which occurred at Cootamundra Aerodrome, NSW on 25 June 2001.
The Report includes Recommendation A:

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review the location of fire bottles on aircraft to reduce the possibility of a premature discharge of fire retardant where the temperature in the area that contains the fire bottle rises above the setting of the fusible valve.

'The Authority concurs that the installation of a fire bottle in the same compartment that may experience a fire, can, in the event of a fire in the compartment, render the fire extinguisher system ineffective.

'Therefore CASA is undertaking an investigation into the fire extinguisher system installed on this type of aircraft and its location. CASA will also review the certification process and whether this aircraft met the requirements of Civil Aviation Order, CAO 101.4. The Authority will advise you of the outcome and our full response to the Recommendation following this investigation.
'Thank you for bringing this matter to the attention of the Authority.'

Further correspondence
Date issued: 06 June 2003
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response status: Closed - Partially Accepted
Response text:

I refer to CASA's letter of 18 November 2002 concerning ATSB Recommendation R20020054 contained in Aviation Report 200102710 on the accident involving Embraer Banteirante VH-OZG which occurred at Cootamundra Aerodrome on 25 June 2001.

The Authority gave an undertaking to investigate the fire extinguisher system installed on this type of aircraft and its location. It was indicated, also, that a review of the certification process and whether this aircraft met the requirements of Civil Aviation Order CAO 101.4 would be conducted.

CASA has reviewed the regulations regarding the location of fire bottles, in particular the regulations regarding thermal aspects of fire extinguisher system installation. The review considers that existing requirements in place adequately address the correct location of fire bottles where it is required to have such systems fitted.

Fire extinguisher systems, where required, are determined by the certification basis and the operational category of the aeroplane. Where a fire extinguisher system is required to be installed, such a fire extinguisher system will require that consideration be given to the location of certain components. CASA requires the correct installation of such installations be determined by FAR 25.1195, FAR 25.1197, FAR 25.1199, and FAR 25.1201, or British equivalent.

Aircraft certificated to FAR 25 standard will already incorporate an appropriate system to the approved standard. For aeroplanes certificated under FAR 23, prior to amendment 34, consideration is based on CAO 101.4 that refers to FAR 25.1195, FAR 25.1197, FAR 25.1199, and FAR 25.1201, or British equivalent.

With reference to VH-OZG, the aeroplane was issued with a certificate of airworthiness in the normal category. This aeroplane did not require an appropriate fire extinguisher system fitted. The fire extinguisher system fitted was not part of the certification process and was not required by the aeroplanes operational classification. The fire extinguisher system installed would not be considered appropriate for this aeroplane operating in the transport category. However certain models of the EMB 110 aeroplane do have a fire extinguisher system fitted that would be compliant with the requirements of CAO 101.4, and therefore be allowed to operate in the transport category.

CASA is satisfied that the regulations currently in place, allow for the correct determination of what fire extinguisher equipment and installation of such equipment is, based on the certification basis and the operational basis of the aeroplane. The current standards provide the necessary information to determine the correct installation of fire extinguishers. Correct installation when required will prevent premature discharge of the fire retardant.

A/g Executive Manager Aviation Safety Standards

 
Share this page Comment
Last update 03 April 2012