Recommendation R20010168

Recommendation issued to: Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Recommendation details
Output No: R20010168
Date issued: 07 November 2001
Safety action status:
Background: Why this Recommendation was developed

Output text

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends the Civil Aviation Safety Authority conduct a review of all Boeing jet aircraft maintenance documentation to ensure completeness of main cabin door escape slide deactivation and activation to return to service following maintenance action.

Initial response
Date issued: 11 September 2001
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Action status: Open
Response text:

CASA has reviewed your recommendation and will be discussing the issue with our officers responsible for operators of aircraft equipped with escape slides. Our intention is to determine an appropriate action to ensure operators are made aware of the issue and check their procedures.

Further correspondence
Date issued: 06 March 2002
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response status: Monitor
Response text:

In response to Recommendation R200100168, CASA advises the following:

CASA has requested our Airline Operations Offices responsible for the airlines operating Boeing Jet aircraft, to take appropriate action to review the airlines' main cabin door escape slide deactivation and reactivation maintenance procedures.

CASA has received advice back from one of our Airline Operations Offices with regard to Boeing 737 aircraft. A number of revisions have been made to the airlines' maintenance documentation and procedures including the inclusion of an independent inspection. CASA feels that the amendments have satisfactorily addressed the ATSB Recommendation.

A response from our other Airline Operations Office is expected in the near future, at which time CASA undertakes to advise the Australian Transport Safety Bureau of the action undertaken.

Further correspondence
Date issued: 14 November 2002
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response status: Closed - Accepted
Response text:

Thank you for your letter of 2 September 2002 regarding Recommendation R20010168. You sought a response concerning documentation and proposed revisions from one of the Authority's Airline Offices relating to aircraft other than B737 models. Please accept my apologies for the delay in my reply. A review of the airlines escape slide maintenance procedures has revealed that a considerable amount of effort has been made by the operator to closely analyse the cause of escape slide incidents and remedy the problems found. This review has resulted in a number of procedural and design changes being introduced. A summary of the actions undertaken by the operator is attached for the information of the ATSB. CASA believes that this action satisfactorily addresses the Recommendation. Thank you for bringing this matter to the attention of the Authority.

B747 & B767
• Following any maintenance on the Slide/Raft there is now an additional task card maintenance check and certification requirement to ensure that the safety pin has been removed and stowed.
• Task cards requiring certification are also provided to deactivate/activate the door assist bottle with instructions to fit a safety pin in the door select lever.
• Action has been initiated to introduce a separate check to deactivate/reactivate the slide raft systems at the completion of "C" Checks. An additional task card will also be included to ensure safety pins are not fitted to the slide bottles and are correctly stowed.
• Longer streamers will also be fitted to the safety pins so they will protrude outside the door bustles.
• The airline is also experimenting with a modified (longer) safety pin, which is currently on trial.

Last update 01 April 2011