At about 1324 Eastern Standard Time on 28 July 2014, the flight crew of an Airbus A320 aircraft, registered VH-VFU, was preparing the aircraft for the return leg from Sydney, New South Wales, to Adelaide, South Australia.
ATC issued the crew with a departure clearance for runway 16L. A Configuration 2 (flap and slat setting) was required for take-off. Shortly after, ATC advised the crew that the clearance was cancelled and re-issued a new departure clearance for runway 34L.
As a Configuration 1 + F would now be required for take-off, the FMGC was updated. The crew then briefed on the new departure, however neither crew member recalled specifically briefing on the changed take-off configuration.
The PM inadvertently selected the originally calculated Flap 2 take-off setting. He then checked the flap position on the upper ECAM. As he believed he needed to set flap 2, the flap 2 setting displayed on the ECAM confirmed what he believed to be correct.
Despite carrying out all the required flows and checklists, as they taxied the aircraft to the runway 34L holding point, neither of the crew detected the incorrect configuration setting. The aircraft departed normally, and at about 800 ft the crew detected and managed the error and continued to Adelaide.
Jetstar has advised the ATSB they are taking the following Safety Actions.
Jetstar has decided to undertake a detailed review of the results from their Flight Safety Integration Audit (FSIA) program. This is a continuous safety audit program targeted toward identifying specific operational threats and risks associated with failed/erroneous Human-Machine Interface activities. The airline will then develop action plans to address any identified themes.
Jetstar will also incorporate a summary of the incident in the next edition of the company flight crew Technical Newsletter. This will include suggestions on how to mitigate against similar occurrences.