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Summary

Summary

At about 2307 on 6 September 2010 a safeworking irregularity involving freight train 2CM3 occurred at Bomen in New South Wales.

The network controller attempted to set the route for freight train 2CM3 to depart Bomen Yard and proceed onto the mainline towards Melbourne. The network controller was unable to change absolute signal BN27 from a stop (red) aspect to a proceed aspect (green), so he gave verbal authorisation to the driver of train 2CM3 to depart Bomen and pass signal BN27 while it was displaying a stop indication. However, issuing a verbal authorisation was not in compliance with the safeworking rules in this case. The network controller should have issued a written Special Proceed Authority (SPA) to authorise train 2CM3 to pass signal BN27 at stop.

The investigation found that a procedural error by the network controller was the main factor that contributed to the incident. There were no injuries or damage to rolling stock or other property as a result of the incident.

 
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