Immediately following the occurrence, the operator reviewed the information supplied by the wheel and aircraft manufacturers and assessed the wheels on their fleet. Subsequently, the operator elected to remove ten wheels from service that fell within an identified risk profile The operator has further reported to the ATSB that since this occurrence, it has altered its non-destructive wheel inspection procedure to include an ultrasonic inspection in accordance with Honeywell Standard Practices Manual, ATS Number 32-49, Temporary Revision No 32-1, dated 1 May 2009.
Initially, the operator performed the inspection at each tyre change after the 11th change. However, following the results of a number of inspections, and in conjunction with the Honeywell Service Bulletin (2612311-32-003), the operator has since altered the inspection in line with the Service Bulletin and performs an ultrasonic inspection of the bearing bore at every fifth tyre change. As a result of the occurrence, the operator also performed a review of its engineering change evaluation procedure which resulted in changes to the process flow chart to include additional steps and a more structured risk assessment
The ATSB is satisfied that the action taken by the aircraft operator adequately addresses the safety issue.