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Breakdown of separation, 22 km south-west of Sydney Airport, NSW, 4 April 2007, VH-VON, Boeing Company 737-8FE, B-HLW, Airbus A330-300
Aviation Safety Investigation Report - Final
Breakdown of separation, 22 km south-west of Sydney Airport, NSW, 4 April 2007, VH-VON, Boeing Company 737-8FE, B-HLW, Airbus A330-300
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Occurrence Details
| Occurrence Number: |
200701982 |
Location: |
12 NM southwest Sydney |
| Occurrence Date: |
04 April 2007
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State: |
NSW |
| Occurrence Time: |
0805 EST |
Highest Injury Level: |
None |
| Occurrence Category: |
Incident |
Investigation Type: |
Occurrence Investigation |
| Occurrence Class: |
Airspace |
Investigation Status: |
Completed |
| Occurrence Type: |
Aircraft Separation |
Release Date: |
18 December 2007
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Aircraft Details| Aircraft Manufacturer: | Boeing Co | Aircraft Model: | 737-8FE | | Aircraft Registration: | VH-VON | Serial Number: | 33795 | | Type of Operation: | High Capacity Air Transport | | Damage to Aircraft: | Nil | | Departure Point: | Melbourne, Vic | Departure Time: | nk | | Destination: | Sydney, NSW | | Crew Details: | Role | Class of Licence | Hours on Type | Hours Total | | | Pilot-in-Command | ATPL | nk | nk |
2nd Aircraft Details| Aircraft Manufacturer: | Airbus Industrie | Aircraft Model: | A330-343x | | Aircraft Registration: | B-HLW | Serial Number: | nk | | Type of Operation: | High Capacity Air Transport | | Damage to Aircraft: | Nil | | Departure Point: | Sydney, NSW | Departure Time: | nk | | Destination: | Hong Kong | | Crew Details: | Role | Class of Licence | Hours on Type | Hours Total | | | Pilot-in-Command | ATPL | nk | nk |
On 4 April 2007 at about 0809 Eastern Standard Time a Boeing Aircraft Company 737-8FE registered VH-VON was inbound to Sydney, NSW from Melbourne, Vic. on descent to 6,000 ft and an Airbus A330-342X, registered B-HLW was departing Sydney for Hong Kong on climb to 7,000 ft. The distance between the aircraft reduced to 1.9 NM horizontal and 600 ft vertical separation. Separation standards as specified in the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) required the provision of either 3 NM horizontal or 1,000 ft vertical separation between the aircraft. There was a breakdown of separation.
The loss of separation occurred as a result of the separation that was planned by the air traffic control officer being based on an incorrect cleared flight level (CFL) that had been entered into the controller's air situation display (ASD). The investigation concluded that this data entry error occurred within 2 minutes of the air traffic controller assuming responsibility for the control position, and that the reconfiguration of the in-use console by the controller during that time increased the risk of the controller being distracted from the traffic separation task.
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