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  Breakdown of separation, 22 km south-west of Sydney Airport, NSW, 4 April 2007, VH-VON, Boeing Company 737-8FE, B-HLW, Airbus A330-300

Aviation Safety Investigation Report - Final

Breakdown of separation, 22 km south-west of Sydney Airport, NSW, 4 April 2007, VH-VON, Boeing Company 737-8FE, B-HLW, Airbus A330-300

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Occurrence Details
Occurrence Number: 200701982 Location: 12 NM southwest Sydney
Occurrence Date: 04 April 2007 State: NSW
Occurrence Time: 0805 EST Highest Injury Level: None
Occurrence Category: Incident Investigation Type: Occurrence Investigation
Occurrence Class: Airspace Investigation Status: Completed
Occurrence Type: Aircraft Separation Release Date: 18 December 2007

Aircraft Details
Aircraft Manufacturer:Boeing CoAircraft Model:737-8FE
Aircraft Registration:VH-VONSerial Number:33795
Type of Operation:High Capacity Air Transport
Damage to Aircraft:Nil
Departure Point:Melbourne, VicDeparture Time:nk
Destination:Sydney, NSW
Crew Details:RoleClass of LicenceHours on TypeHours Total
 Pilot-in-CommandATPLnknk
2nd Aircraft Details
Aircraft Manufacturer:Airbus IndustrieAircraft Model:A330-343x
Aircraft Registration:B-HLWSerial Number:nk
Type of Operation:High Capacity Air Transport
Damage to Aircraft:Nil
Departure Point:Sydney, NSW Departure Time:nk
Destination:Hong Kong
Crew Details:RoleClass of LicenceHours on TypeHours Total
 Pilot-in-CommandATPLnknk

On 4 April 2007 at about 0809 Eastern Standard Time a Boeing Aircraft Company 737-8FE registered VH-VON was inbound to Sydney, NSW from Melbourne, Vic. on descent to 6,000 ft and an Airbus A330-342X, registered B-HLW was departing Sydney for Hong Kong on climb to 7,000 ft. The distance between the aircraft reduced to 1.9 NM horizontal and 600 ft vertical separation. Separation standards as specified in the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) required the provision of either 3 NM horizontal or 1,000 ft vertical separation between the aircraft. There was a breakdown of separation.

The loss of separation occurred as a result of the separation that was planned by the air traffic control officer being based on an incorrect cleared flight level (CFL) that had been entered into the controller's air situation display (ASD). The investigation concluded that this data entry error occurred within 2 minutes of the air traffic controller assuming responsibility for the control position, and that the reconfiguration of the in-use console by the controller during that time increased the risk of the controller being distracted from the traffic separation task.

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Last Updated: 18 December, 2007