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On 31 August 2005, the crew of a Fairchild Industries Inc SA227–DC (Metro) aircraft had been issued a clearance for a visual approach to runway 14 at Brisbane Airport. At about the same time, the crew of a Boeing Company 717–200 (717) aircraft had been issued a take-off clearance from runway 01. The crew of the Metro commenced a go-around from runway 14 at about the same time the 717 became airborne from runway 01. The 717 crossed about 625 m in front of, and 580 ft above, the Metro. There was a breakdown of separation.

The Metro’s descent to Brisbane had been restricted by another aircraft, which placed it above the normal descent profile. The crew of the Metro subsequently continued an approach that was unlikely to be conducted successfully. The aerodrome controller misjudged the position of the Metro, which resulted in the incorrect application of separation standards. This also meant that the controller did not give adequate consideration to the likelihood of a go-around by the crew of the Metro.

After the Metro crew commenced the go-around, the controller was unable to visually separate the aircraft. The controller had not provided traffic information to the crew of either aircraft, nor was he required to do so. The controller attempted to make the Metro crew aware of the 717, but did not provide the information in the form of a safety alert as required by the Manual of Air Traffic Services.

Without prior knowledge of the 717, the crew of the Metro found it difficult to identify the correct aircraft, as the 717 was initially below their level and masked by background lighting.

As a result of previous occurrences, the ATSB had previously issued a safety recommendation to Airservices Australia in October 2006 in relation to the provision of relevant traffic information, to enhance pilot situational awareness.

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