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  Serious injury to a crew member on board River Embley

Marine Safety Investigation Report - Final

Serious injury to a crew member on board River Embley

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Occurrence Details
Occurrence Number: 221 Location: Gladstone
Occurrence Date: 14 October 2005 State: QLD
Occurrence Time: UTC+10 Highest Injury Level: Serious
Occurrence Category: Incident Investigation Type: Occurrence Investigation
Occurrence Class: Investigation Status: Completed
Occurrence Type: Injury Release Date: 14 June 2006
Injuries:CrewPassengerGroundTotal
Serious1001
Total1001

Vessel Details
Vessel:River EmbleyFlag:Aus
IMO:8018144
Type of Operation:Bulk carrier
Damage to Vessel:Nil
Departure Point:Sydney, NSWDeparture Time:1340
Destination:Gladstone, Qld

River Embley arrived at the anchorage off Gladstone at 0902 on the morning of 14 October. After ‘finished with engines’, the diesel alternator was put on line and the steam plant was shut down to allow for repairs on the number two turbo alternator exhaust steam valve.

At about 1010, after checking that the exhaust steam system had drained, the chief engineer and third engineer started working on the valve. A short time later, while they were dismantling the valve a thousand litres of pressurised hot water unexpectedly started to spray from the valve and onto the chief engineer standing on staging below.

In an effort to escape the hot water spray the chief engineer tried to jump clear of the staging but became entangled in the securing rope which had formed a barrier.

The ship’s crew mounted an immediate first aid response and the master organised a helicopter evacuation. The chief engineer was transported to Gladstone Hospital and later transferred to the Royal Brisbane Hospital intensive care unit.

The report concludes that the engineers did not fully assess the exhaust steam piping system and its drainage arrangements, or allow sufficient time for the exhaust steam system to completely drain before starting to work on the valve.

The ship’s work permit system and job safety analysis procedures were not utilised by the engineering crew and deficiencies in safety management were not identified in two audits prior to the accident.
It is also considered that a sizable experience gradient between the chief engineer and the other engineers along with a lack of team training allowed a series of ‘single person’ errors to go unchecked and unquestioned.

The ATSB has made several safety recommendations aimed at preventing further accidents.

Download Complete Report PDF 1.5Mb

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

River Embley arrived at the anchorage off Gladstone at 0902 on the morning of 14 October. After ‘finished with engines’, the diesel alternator was put on line and the steam plant was shut down to allow for repairs on the number two turbo alternator exhaust steam valve.

At about 1010, after checking that the exhaust steam system had drained, the chief engineer and third engineer started working on the valve. A short time later, while they were dismantling the valve, hot condensate unexpectedly started spraying from the gap between the valve’s bonnet and body.

In an effort to escape the hot condensate spray, the third engineer fled inboard. He was unhurt. At the same time the chief engineer jumped aft to clear the staging and became entangled in the rope securing it. The hot condensate sprayed onto the chief engineer.

The third engineer went to the chief engineer’s assistance and freed him from the rope and helped him to the nearby emergency shower.

The bridge was notified and the chief mate and third mate went to the engine room to assist. It was apparent that the chief engineer would need medical assistance. The master was informed, and he contacted the company’s Gladstone office requesting an immediate helicopter evacuation.

At 1204, the rescue helicopter landed on board River Embley.

With assistance from the ship’s crew and the paramedic, the chief engineer walked to the helicopter, and at 1234, the helicopter departed the ship.

The chief engineer was transported to Gladstone Hospital, where he was assessed as having burns to 45 percent of his body. He was later transferred to the Royal Brisbane Hospital intensive care unit.

The report finds that when the valve was cracked open, the condensate in the pipe between the valve and the exhaust steam range sprayed from the partially dismantled valve.

The report concludes that the control measures outlined in the vessels safety management system were not implemented and the engineers did not fully assess the exhaust steam piping system, and its drainage arrangements or allow sufficient time for the exhaust steam system to completely drain.

It is considered that if they had been implemented, the safety management system procedures and associated checklists would not have ensured adequate protection for the engineers working on the steam valve. It is also possible that a sizable experience gradient between the chief engineer and the other engineers, along with a lack of team training, allowed a series of ‘single person’ errors to go unchecked and unquestioned.

It is also considered that the quick action of all concerned in administering first aid and facilitating a timely helicopter evacuation assisted in minimising the effect of the injuries sustained by the chief engineer.


Related Links:Media Release | Marine Recommendation MR20060022 | Marine Recommendation MR20060023 | Marine Recommendation MR20060024 |

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Last Updated: 3 January, 2008