At 1900 on 26 February 2004, the Bahamas registered passenger
ship Astor let go its mooring lines and departed the
Queensland port of Townsville.
The ship, equipped with twin rudders, controllable pitch main
propellers and a single bow thruster, did not require a tug for the
departure. The master, as is common practice on passenger ships,
manoeuvred the ship clear of the berth and then, even though this
was his first visit to Townsville, kept the conduct of the ship
without consulting the harbour pilot. The pilot adopted an advisory
role.
As the ship was turning from the harbour into Platypus Channel,
part of the approach channel to the port, it grounded on its port
side. The ship heeled three degrees to starboard and, after about
three minutes, slid clear of the bank without assistance and
continued out of the channel.
After it had cleared the channel, the ship stopped for about two
hours to check that the hull was not breached and that all
machinery was operating normally. Immediately upon notification of
the grounding, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
placed a detention order on the ship until the ship's
classification society was satisfied that Astor was seaworthy. When
it was confirmed that the hull and machinery were in proper
condition the detention order was lifted and the ship then
proceeded to Cairns. At Cairns, an underwater survey of the hull
was carried out to ascertain the extent of any damage.
Based on the available evidence the report concludes that:
- The investigation has been unable to determine the degree, if
any, to which a reported steering malfunction contributed to the
grounding.
The following factors, however, are considered to have
contributed to the incident on 26 February 2004, independently from
any steering malfunction:
- The master did not accept the pilot's advice after the ship
left the berth.
- Communications on the bridge were in a language the pilot was
not able to understand.
- The ship's master and bridge team members did not employ good
Bridge Resource Management practices at any time leading up to the
grounding.
- The master had not positioned the ship correctly for a turn to
starboard into Platypus Channel.
- The master did not present an outward passage plan to any of
those present on the bridge at the time of departure.
The investigation into the grounding of Astor was complicated by
the fact that Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) data was not backed up in
the time immediately after the grounding (highlighting a deficiency
in crew training in this important facet of ship operations) and by
the fact that company procedures were not followed with respect to
the keeping of bridge records.
The investigation showed that crucial VDR information is easily
lost by unintentional actions.
Of additional concern to the safety of navigation and the
prevention of pollution on the Australian coast is that the master
did not declare any steering defect to the Cairns pilot or port
authority and Astor entered the Cairns Channel using only
one steering motor on the port rudder without the pilot's
knowledge.
This reports recommends that:
- Ship owners, managers, operators and masters of ships ensure
that all bridge staff are fully trained in the correct operation of
VDR data backup procedures for the particular ship on which they
are serving.
- Manufacturers of VDR units should ensure that indicator lights
are free of any possible ambiguity and that consideration be given
to printing emergency backup instructions on VDR control panels on
ships' bridges.
- Masters of vessels should not actively con the ship directly
during pilotage unless they are familiar with the port and they do
so in full agreement with any pilot.
- Ships' masters should ensure that all bridge orders in pilotage
waters are in a language understood by pilots and ships'
staff.
- Ship owners, managers and operators should instruct masters and
ships's to use all elements of effective Bridge Resource Management
at all times.
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