Tauranga Chief arrived at Sydney from Port Kembla on 17
January 2003 on its normal liner route. It had sailed from Port
Kembla the previous evening and arrived at the Sydney pilot
boarding ground on schedule at 0300 local time. The pilot boarded
as planned and the ship continued inwards toward the booked berth
at White Bay container terminal.
When the ship came to an intended course alteration position in
the harbour, east of Bradleys Head, the pilot initiated the turn to
starboard to round the headland. He firstly ordered 5 starboard
rudder and, when the ship did not respond quickly enough, he
increased the order to starboard 10. The rate of swing increased
markedly and so the pilot ordered port 20 to slow the swing. The
seaman on the wheel made an error executing this last wheel order
and instead applied starboard 20 wheel. Before the consequences of
this error could be corrected, the ship ran aground on a mud/sand
patch just south of the light on the southern end of the
headland.
Two harbour tugs, which were waiting to assist the berthing
operations for the ship, were called to the location and the ship
was refloated using the tugs, the ship's anchor and main engine
after being aground for about half an hour. Tauranga Chief
continued to its berth where divers checked the ships hull
externally for any damage, while it was alongside the wharf for
cargo operations.
Only slight, localised scratching of the underwater paintwork on
the bottom of the hull under the bulbous bow and around the forward
end of the hull was reported after the divers inspection and video
report so the ship was released by AMSA to continue its voyage to
New Zealand.
The report concludes that the grounding was caused by an error
in the execution of wheel orders during a routine course
alteration. Contributing factors identified included:
- The grounding was initiated by an error in the execution of
wheel orders during a routine course alteration.
- The pilot did not order midships before ordering counter
rudder. This may have contributed to the helmsmans failure to
recognise and act upon the change in rudder direction.
- The seaman on the wheel was possibly affected by fatigue,
predominantly caused by the circadian low at the time of the
incident and compounded by the effects of circadian dysrhythmia
(jet lag). The concentration and reaction time of the master and
OOW may also have been affected by these effects.
- The handling characteristics of the ship, due to its load and
trim at the time of the incident, made the handling of the ship
more difficult than usual. The following flood tide and wind on the
passage down the harbour would have accelerated the rate of turn
which reduced the likelihood of success of the attempted corrective
actions.
The report makes recommendations relating to pilotage and crew
change practices.
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