



GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

Reference No.

## AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SUMMARY REPORT

AS/731/1036

Publication of this report is authorized by the Secretary under the provisions of Air Navigation Regulations 283 (1)

## 1. LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE

Thursday Island Aerodrome, Horn Island, Queensland	Height a.m.s.l. 15 feet	Date 22.12.73	Time (Local) 0735 hours	Zone EST
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## 2. THE AIRCRAFT

Make and Model Lockheed Hudson MK 3	Registration VH-AGX	Certificate of Airworthiness Valid from 7 December 1973
Certificate of Registration issued to Adastra Aerial Surveys Pty. Ltd. 41 Vickers Avenue, MASCOT, NEW SOUTH WALES	Operator Adastra Aerial Surveys Pty. Ltd. 41 Vickers Avenue, MASCOT, NEW SOUTH WALES	Degree of damage to aircraft Substantial
		Other property damaged Nil
Defects discovered Nil		

## 3. THE FLIGHT

Last or intended departure point Thursday Island	Time of departure 0734 hours	Next point of intended landing Thursday Island	Purpose of flight Local flight	Class of operation Private
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## 4. THE CREW

Name	Status	Age	Class of licence	Hours on type	Total hours	Degree of injury
Bernd DANNECKER	Pilot	30	Commercial	35	1830	Minor

## 5. OTHER PERSONS (All passengers and persons injured on ground)

Name	Status	Degree of injury	Name	Status	Degree of injury
Mr Michael EVES	Camera Operator	Minor			

## 6. RELEVANT EVENTS

The pilot completed conversion training on the Hudson type aircraft on 8 December 1973 and since that date he had flown some five hours as pilot in command of the type. His conversion training did not include an abandoned take-off demonstration but he had been verbally briefed on the exercise.

He was aware that the oil consumption rate of the port engine of VH-AGX was 'high' but less than the maximum permissible rate. He was aware that the oil pressure gauge for the port engine indicated that, after engine start-up, normal operating pressure was attained at a slower rate than that for the starboard engine, also the gauge was slow to rise when increased power was applied to the port engine.

After making a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft the pilot started the engines and taxied the aircraft for take-off from runway 26. He carried out pre-take-off checks, including run-up of the engines, and then commenced the take-off. At a speed estimated by the pilot as 80 knots, he observed fluctuations in the oil pressure gauge of the port engine and he closed both throttles and abandoned the take-off. The tail of the aircraft was well off the ground at this stage, the pilot therefore attempted to lower the tail but the aircraft became airborne for a short period. He then took control action to return first the mainwheels and subsequently the tail wheel to the runway. When all three wheels were on the ground, heavy braking was applied but the aircraft over-ran the runway, continued through the prepared over-run area and finally ran into a creek some 180 metres beyond the sealed end of the runway.

Subsequent examination of the port engine and its associated oil pressure indicating system did not disclose evidence of any defect or malfunction. The available performance data for the aircraft type indicates that, in the conditions existing at the time of the accident, it should have been possible to abandon the take-off at a speed not exceeding 92 knots and bring the aircraft to a halt within the confines of the runway. Nevertheless optimum conditions of recognition, decision, action, and handling techniques would have been required to successfully abandon the take-off from a speed approaching 92 knots.

## OPINION AS TO CAUSE

The probable cause of the accident was that the pilot, who was inexperienced on the aircraft type, did not adequately employ operating techniques required to ensure the safe completion of the abandoned take-off.

Approved for publication

(R.H. Watts)  
Delegate of the Secretary

Date 23.8.1977